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Inlroduclion 
Introduction 

This study seeks to empirically identify the major determinants of personal saving in 
South Mrica. The paper uses the empirical results to examine whether personal 
savings can be an effective policy instrument for generating economic growth. Chapter 
one begins with a brief discussion of the link between savings and economic growth. 
The nature of personal savings in South Mrica is then reviewed . Because of the 
composition of personal savings, it is argued that using personal savings as a target of 
policy will be ineffective. Firstly, pension funds (contractual saving) reduce the need 
for other forms of saving (i.e. discretionary saving). Policy measures to increase the 
level of contractual saving will merely result in a change in composition of personal 
savings If a wealth effect is induced which reduces the need for precautionary saving, 
then total saving may fall (because consumption increases) Secondly, because 
contractual saving dominates the composition of personal saving in South Mrica; and 
is less liquid than other forms of saving, it is suggested that policy measures (e .g. 
saving incentives) to boost the personal savings rate will be impotent. Policy 
ineffectiveness results because savings cannot be easily substituted back to 
discretionary savings plans. Lack of substitutability is exacerbated by low real income 
growth. These issues raise the following questions which must be answered to aid 
policy formulation ; 
1. 	 Have pension funds had a positive impact on personal saving, or would saving be 
higher in the absence of pension funds? If so by how much? 
2. 	 Will taxation of pension funds result in a shift in the composition of total savings? 
If a shift does result, will this affect total saving? 
3. 	 To what degree will saving incentives encourage additional saving? 
These questions have not been adequately addressed in earlier research because 
empirical evidence has not been provided to support conclusions. Answering these 
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Chapter one: Saving and th~ EconolllY 
Chapter one 
Saving and the Economy 
This chapter provides an overview of the importance of saving in the South African 
economy. Firstly, it is shown that conflicting views on the role of saving in the growth 
process concern whether saving can shift an economy from one steady state to the 
next. However, it is not disputed that while an economy is in transition between steady 
states, saving can stimulate economic growth. Secondly, given that saving is important 
at a macroeconomic level, attention is paid to the role of personal saving in the South 
African economy. As will be shown, the composition of personal saving biases heavily 
towards contractual saving. It is argued that this bias may leave few policy options to 
strengthen the personal saving rate. A review of the empirical literature on the impact 
of pension funds on saving, and the effectiveness of using the interest rate as a policy 
tool to strengthen the personal saving rate is also provided . 
1.1. How does saving affect economic growth? 
It is not disputed that savings are required to maintain the capital stock. The issue on 
which economists do disagree is the role of saving in the long-term economic growth 
process. Exogenous growth theorists argue that saving increase the growth rate of 
income in the short-ru , but in the long-run will only increase the level of capital and 
income per head, but not the growth rate. Endogenous growth models argue that 
there are feedbacks between saving and growth in the long-run. The following 
sections explore these models. 
1.1.1 Neoclassical exogenous growth theory 
In the neoclassical growth model pioneered by Solow's (1956) seminal paper, saving 
influences economic growth in the following way. Saving is used to finance additions 
to the capital stock. An economy with an initially low capital-labour ratio 1 will have a 
I For instance a developing economy. 
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of to 
labour at same rate. growth rate 
it 
can as Y = L are 
growth are 
to saving. 
South 
(1 
Others 
asserts 
2 Solow (I out that this is not an essential It is for purposes. 
J See for instance The Katz Conunission First Interim on tht! into the tax stnlcture of 
South Africa. concluded that is nol a This is 
by the of economic which denies any causal link bdwet::n an increast:: in the 
ratio and an increase in economic growth" (p.244). 
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Chapter O I1 ~: Savil1g and the Economy 
saving rate will have a positive impact on economic growth. There is ample empirical 
and anecdotal evidence that the saving rate is not at its optimum level. The Annual 
Economic Report of the Reserve Bank (1994) asserts that aggregate saving will have 
to be raised to 22 percent o(gross domestic product to support a real economic 
growth rate of 2Y2 percent per annum, and 24 percent to maintain a 3 ~ percent annual 
growth rate . More recently, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
macroeconomic strategy (GEAR) forecasts GDP growth assuming the implementation 
of an integrated macroeconomic strategy. In their forecasts , gross domestic saying 
need to be maintained at around 22 percent of GDP to sustain a 6.1 percent growth 
rate in real GDP by the year 2000 4 In 1995 the ratio of gross domestic saving to GDP 
was 16.7 percent. This implies that gross domestic saving will have to increase by 
around 32 percent (R25,579 million)5 to meet this target. 
Therefore, there is significant potential for increases in the saving ratio to positively 
impact on economic growth in South Africa. 
1.2.1 Personal Saving 
Given that saving is important at a macroeconomic level, should public or private 
sector saving be the focus of policy? This study will partly answer this question by 
analysing personal saving in South Africa. Issues relating to corporate and public 
saving, although very important, are beyond the scope of this study. 
In the national accounts personal saving is measured as the surplus of current income 
over current expenditure during a particular period . Current income includes direct 
renumeration of employees, employer contributions to retirement funds, income from 
property and investments (including investment income of retirement funds), and 
retained income of non-profit institutions serving households. Any current expenditure 
financed by credit is treated as negative saving. 
4 One assumption of thi s forecast is an increase in foreign direct investmt!nt Irom 1996-2000 of around 4 19 
pt!rct!nt. 
~ In 1995 rands. 
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Personal saving is estimated with a high margin of error. When calculating gross 
domestic saving, the assumption is made that national accounting identities hold and 
that the other components of aggregate domestic saving are more accurately 
calculated . Because of these' assumptions, personal saving is the balancing item on the 
capital finance account. 6 
1.2.1.1 The composition of personal saving 
Personal saving can be divided into contractual and discretionary saving. Contractual 
saving, often called managed saving, consists of those commitments such as premiums 
on insurance policies, contributions to pension funds, and households ' mortgage loan 
repayments . Discretionary saving is where individuals have direct control over the 
flows, and are not bound by any commitments. Figure 1. 1 shows the level and 
composition of personal saving over a thirty year period . 
(J'J 
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Figure 1.1: Personal saving in South Africa 1962-1992 
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NB: Discretionary saving was calculated as total personal savin g less contractual savin g. 
Source: South African Statistics, nle Mouton Repon. 
6 The capital fin ance accowlt describes how phys ical capital is accumulated and how thi s accumula tion is 
financed . Gross fi xed in vestment and changes in in ventories are the means of accumulati on. The main source 
of the finance is gross domestic saving. Any shortfall is made up by foreign inllows. 
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Chapter one: Saving and the Economy 
The first observation from Figure 1.1 is the decline in personal saving from the early 
1980s. It is argued by some commentators that the cause of the decline is low levels of 
households' after-tax real income. 7 
The second observation is that the composition of personal saving changed 
significantly from the early 1980s. Contractual saving in 1992 totalled more than 70 
percent of gross domestic saving. It is often argued that the differentiation between 
contractual and discretionary saving is unimportant from a macroeconomic viewpoint. 8 
However, Munnell (1976) argues that at a macroeconomic level, in order to predict the 
future supply of finance, it is vital to establish if the reserves accumulated in pension 
funds are being offset by lower individual saving or whether these reserves represent a 
net addition to the supply of capital in the economy. 
One of the reasons for the shift in saving is the disparity in rates of return available 
between contractual and discretionary saving. Retirement saving has long had 
favourable tax treatment which has increased its return relative to self-managed saving 
plans. 9 The margin available from investing in a managed (contractual) saving scheme 
i.e. the real return from contractual saving less the real post-tax return from 
discretionary schemes is reflected in the Figure 1.2. The tax advantage from investing 
in a contractual saving scheme would encourage new saving generated from income 
growth to flow to those schemes. 
The third observation is that when contractual saving began to increase dramatically 
from the early 1980s, real per capita personal saving declined significantly. From 1962 
until 1980, real per capita personal saving averaged 23.4 percent of gross domestic 
saving. From 1981 until 1995, real per capita personal saving averaged just 9.7 
percent. 
7 See for instance the Mouton Report (1992:64) 

g See for instance Prinsloo (1994). 

9 Barr & Kantor (1994) cit!! Margo Conunission calculations that life offices had paid an average rate of tax of 

7.9 percent on all investment income. Investment income of self-managed saving plans is taxed at progressive 
rates (excluding the first R2,OOO of interest income). 
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Chaplcr onc: Saving and Ih~ Economy 
Figure 1.2: The premium from contractual saving in South Africa: 1971-1995 
25 
15 
-c: (1) 
~ 10 
(1) 
a. 
5 
o 
-s 
year 
Source: The nominal relum from retirement funds unlil 1990 was extracled from the Moulon Report. From 1990 unlil 
1995, the relum 10 unillrusts was used 10 rale forward the Moulon Report ligures. The real after-tax relum to bank 
deposits was taken from Prinsloo (1994). 
Is the timing of the fall in saving and the increase in contractual saving in Figure 1.1 
coincidental or has contractual saving had a dampening effect on total household 
saving? This study seeks to answer this question. 10 
High flows to contractual saving schemes limits the income available for discretionary 
saving. This is because once an individual is committed to a managed saving scheme, 
there are disincentives to break the contract. Thus, contractual saving imposes a form 
of liquidity constraint on the individual. Any increase in discretionary saving must 
therefore come from growth in real income given that consumption is to be maintained. 
It follows that if real income growth is low, growth in discretionary saving will also be 
low. More, formally, discretionary saving at time t will be positive if: 
10 	The Mouton Report (1990) argues that pension funds have not dampened the saving rate but have contributed 
10 the supply of capital in the South African economy, "the role and importance of retirement funds in 
marshalling personal saving funds is clear and cannot be overemphasised .. .in terms of the long-tenn saving 
funds required for flIlancing fixed capital investments, is being harnessed by way of personal contractual 
saving, most of which is with retirement funds" (p.64). 
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1'; - C1 - >0 (I-I) 
Yis Cis IS 
IS we assume C is to income (i.e. 
and is 
. . 
an Increase In 
during 12 reason for is to maintain 
real income growth 
exceeded nrp~pnt 
be 
-t 
Y,C, are Sare 
arrows movement in variables. 
(1 offers to meet 
in a "("I'\p,..,..,,,, tax revenue. 
tax treatment 
lOa rate 
of constant over the individuals lifetime is a result of the 
discussed in two. TIle of PC also con:;tant is based on the observation 
that individuals pay a fixed contribution to retirement funds. 
12 See Prinsloo and Van der Walt (I for all of household debt in South Africa. Consumer credit 
monetary institutions as a percentage of total credit extension to the domestic sector in the 
around I OVz percent In 1984 this ratio increased to 25 Vz percent From 1985 until 1994 
in consulller credit slowed but consumer credit as a percentage of total credit extended to the 
sector still averaged 19Y, over the 
13 Contractual scheme members would also be encouraged to borrow if surrender exist. 
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Chapter one: Saving and the Economy 
means that any increase in real income will be directed towards a managed scheme i.e. 
PC will increase. This will have a favourable impact on total saving, but will be 
partially offset by a wealth effect. The wealth effect arises because of the certainty 
retirement funds provide for the future. 14 A wealth effect would be reflected in a 
increasing, and/or D rising. This means that other saving for retirement, or for 
precautionary purposes may fall. 15 
An implication of this is that if favourable tax treatment in the past has induced 
additional flows to retirement funds (increasing PC) which would have otherwise been 
used in a self-managed scheme, and pension funds depress the personal saving rate 
(through a wealth effect), then total personal saving may have been higher in the 
absence of contractual saving. This is exacerbated if individuals borrowed to invest in 
contractual schemes because rising real interest rates over the 1980s (which increases 
the cost of borrowing) reduces discretionary income. The trends of consumption, 
income, and contractual saving are reflected in the following table. 
Table 1.1: Consumption, income and contractual saving in South Africa: 1971­
1992 
Source: SARB Bulletin, Mouton Report 
The table shows that from 1980 contractual saving doubled as a percentage of income. 
The level of consumption also increased while real income remained relatively 
constant. Real income growth over the same period has been declining. From 1971­
1980, real income growth averaged 2.0 percent. From 1981-1995 it averaged -0.6 
,4 TIle size of the wealth etTect will depend on the credibility of fund managers to produce a return on investment 
in the case of a pri vate pensions. In the case of public pensions, the size of the wealth etTect will depend on 
whether individuals anticipate that in the future, govenunent will increase taxes to finance social security 
benefits. If they do anticipate future tax increases, then the wealth effect will be insignificant. In other words, 
Ricardian Equivalence holds. 
'5 Precautionary is used in the context that without contractual schemes, consumers would have to operate selt~ 
managed schemes which would induce greater uncertainty in the level of their retirement saving. 
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The above discussion points to social security significantly reducing private saving i.e. 
the wealth effect outweighs the retirement effect. Estimates range from 25 percent to 
100 percent. However, for every study which supports this hypothesis, there is 
another which refutes the claim that social security depresses the saving rate. 
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) exposed an error in the computation of social security 
wealth in Feldstein's 1974 paper. Correction for this error led them to conclude that 
the time series evidence "does not support the hypothesis that social security has 
substantially reduced personal saving ... the postwar evidence suggests that social 
security may have increased saving" (p.617). Feldstein (1982), in a reply, argued that 
correction for the error did not substantially affect his original results, although the 
estimated coefficient was smaller. 19 
Barro and MacDonald (1979) examined the behaviour of sixteen industrialised 
countries between 1951 and 1960. They found that cross-country evidence did not 
provide empirical support for the hypothesis that social security reduces private saving, 
but "does not permit an empirical refutation of that hypothesis" (p. 287). 
Further cross-country studies cited by Smith (1990) found evidence in favour of the 
proposition that social security depresses private saving. Kopits and Gotur (1980) 
found the retirement effect to outweigh the wealth effect. They concluded that social 
security systems "were more likely to increase private saving in industrial countries 
than to reduce it" (Smith 1990:25). Modigliani and Sterling (1983) concluded that the 
net effect of social security was close to zero. Koskela and Viren (1983) analysed 16 
industrial countries and found that social security had no effect on the household 
saving rate. 
Barro (1978) using the Feldstein social security wealth variable, estimated conflicting 
results to Feldstein. In his study, social security was statistically insignificant. Horioka 
19 Feldstein's 1982 paper began with "I am embarrassed ... " (p.630). TIle source of the difference between the 
Leimer and Lesnoy estimates and Feldstein ' s corrected estimates is because of social security legislation 
changes in 1972. Feldstein allowed for these changes which he claims influenced the public 's perception of 
social security wealth . 
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( 1986) (cited in Smith, 1990) using Japanese time-series data found the wealth effect 
was exactly offset by the retirement effect resulting in a net impact on private saving of 
around zero. Browning (1982} analysed the effect of public pensions on United 
Kingdom. He found public pensions to increase consumption (wealth effect), but that 
the effect was very small and only marginally significant. Markowski and Palmer 
(1979), cited in Smith (1990), studied the Swedish pension plan. They found that the 
public pension program "contributed to an increase in the level of national saving" (p. 
214). Boyle and Murray (1979) found no effect of Canadian pension plans on 
household saving behaviour. Other studies cited in Smith (1990) supported Boyle and 
Murray's conclusions. A German analysis by Pfaff, Hurler, and Dennerlein (1979) also 
concluded that social security had not reduced personal saving. Oudet (1979) 
examined social security in France. He found that social security programs had not 
reduced the private saving rate. More recently, Duisenberg and Wellink (1995) 
conducted a study using data for eight industrialised countries. Their results suggested 
that the retirement effect outweighs the wealth effect. 
The reasoning for the lack of evidence of social security reducing personal saving is 
that "a pay-as-you-go system may decrease the consumption of the working young by 
more than it increases the consumption of the elderly, particularly since the elderly 
have a tendency to leave estates. The result would be a social security system that 
increases rather than reduces saving" (Smith 1990 :26). A further justification cited by 
Smith is that the saving situation did not change dramatically with the introduction of a 
pay-as-you-go system. This is because a similar private system existed previously i.e. 
families provided for their aged relatives. 
Therefore, the hope of discovering a clear policy direction regarding the impact of 
social security on saving has proved to be unsuccessful. 
1.3.1.4 Private pensions: empirical evidence 
The effect of funded pensions on total saving at an empirical level has been less 
ambiguous. Munnell (1976) using cross section data from men aged between 45 and 
59 from the United States found that private pensions add to total saving about one 
third of the amount contributed to the private plans. This amounted to around $8 
20 
: 
)anal
. 
ificant
, 
. 
. 
L
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter one: Saving and the Economy 
billion in 1973. Hubbard (1986) used microdata also for the U.S .. He concluded that 
"an increase in private pension wealth of one dollar reduces nonpension net worth by 
sixteen cents" (p.174). Smith (1990) cites other studies which provide similar 
conclusions. Gultekin and Logue (1979) estimated nonpension wealth reductions 
between the range of 10 and 19 cents. A further study by Munnell (1988) cited in 
Smith (1990) concluded using U.S. data that if a dollar in a private plan added 30 to 40 
cents to total private (household plus corporate) saving, the addition to private saving 
in 1985 was around $57 billion. Barros (1979), also cited in Smith (1990), credits the 
recognition effect as being an important stimulus for higher levels of saving in Britain. 
1.3.1.5 South African evidence 
There have been no studies conducted in South Africa on the effect pension funds have 
on saving. This is surprising given the significance of contractual saving in South 
Africa. The Mouton Report (1992) looked at the results of studies conducted in other 
countries, and concluded that recommended extensions to the social security system 
"are unlikely to have undesirable side effects on personal saving" (p.386). However, 
the discussion in section 1.2 offers the possibility that pension funds have not boosted 
the personal saving, and may have dampened the saving rate. The analysis in chapter 
three is therefore the first attempt at quantifYing the impact of pension funds on saving 
using South African data. 
1.3.2 The interest elasticity of saving 
Important questions for policy purposes are firstly: if a tax is imposed on interest 
income (which reduces the real return to saving), will saving rise or fall?, by how much 
will personal saving change i.e. what is the interest elasticity of saving? Secondly, how 
does a tax imposed on the income of contractual saving schemes affect personal 
saving?20 It seems reasonable that a reduction in the return of contractual schemes 
would encourage (some) investors to redirect saving flows back to discretionary 
schemes,21 or encourage dissaving. But to what extent? In other words, what is the 
intra-elasticity of personal saving? At a theoretical and empirical level, the answers to 
20 e.g. the 17 percent tax recently inlroduced on interest income of retirement funds. 
21 This does not imply that investors would tenninate contracts with pension schemes. What it does suggest is 
that flows to new schemes might fall. 
21 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapler one: Saving and the Economy 
are depend on such as stage of 
22 
which in opposing rate ot return 
present cost a rand of future consumption, it 
to save more now. Simultaneously, in 
consumer not as 
can save now consume more In 
This is the net m rate on 
on me strengths of 
of IS 
a 
have reported interest elasticities. 
a in interest and that large 
by sharply 
tax rate (l 
on 
have a very negative 
no exists (i.e. an elasticity of 
interest rate on 
casn savmg, eXCluOmg owner-OccuPleO builOmgs anO consumer 
They relatJonsmp. 1 nelf conclusion was 
cannot by policies aimed at the rate 
return (Smith. 1 Smith cites other Hendershott & (1 
concluded tax return not a on 
22 See for instance Sandmo (I 
2J Smith (1990) a useful survt:y. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chart~r on.:: Saving and th~ Economy 
( 1986) a ( real 
interest rates a on 
the 
rate of return was 
( I 
(1 found 
are not 
to a 
at 
rates not 
increase with In 

will 

are 

2. 
Increase. 1nus, to save will 

income available to the consumer once are met. 

et on as a 
Income 
IS shown in 
I
I
l I 
to 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapl~r Oll~: Saving and th" E~ollomy 
Table 1.2: Food as a share ofconsumption e.xpenditure inlow, middle, and upper­
income countries (1990) . 
}{:'=::'iff·:'"j· Coun#Y•..9rt>tJPihg$ 1SW0): \/~. :;HFHf:;;;;:;E:~Hf:}:;::::::;;U((:::;:)?eic.~n~ ·:::::·}:,,:;();:';:;~ :}o,;, ' :$,~':i 
Low-income 55.6 
Lower-middle-income 32.1 
Upper-middle-income 30.5 
High-income 13.0 
South Africa 28.6 
Source: Ogaki er al (1996). 
South Africa, therefore, falls into the upper-middle-income group. The results of 
Ogaki et at's analysis of interest rate sensitivity are shown in the following table. 
Table 1.3: The interest elasticity ofsaving in low, middle, and high income 
countries 
Low-income 
Average for group 
Average for 10 poorest 
Lower-middle-income 
Upper-middle-income 
High-income 
South Africa 
0.312 
0.177 
0.532 
0.560 
0.584 
0.576 
0.306 
0.174 
0.522 
0.549 
0.573 
0.565 
0.300 
0.171 
0.512 
0.539 
0.562 
0.554 
Source Ogaki, OS\ry, & Reinhart (1996). Note that the sample period was 
The size of the interest elasticity therefore is related to the stage of economic 
development - "the relationship between a country's income level and the interest 
elasticity of saving varies as one moves up the income scale" (Ostry & Reinhart, 
1995: 18). In the case of South Africa, their findings suggest that a one percentage 
point increase in the real interest rate will increase the saving by almost three-fifths of a 
percentage point. 
To determine whether this conclusion is consistent with other empirical results in the 
literature, other studies are summarised in Tables 1.4 and 1. 5 according to income 
level. 
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Table 1.4: Interest elasticity ofsaving: developing countries 
1ffit%0J0Km~l!ru~illfXQ1E£:5~2E""" } ';\if:? .•.• n)~I&.r : · :;;U::'::::::;: >H:GQ4MlYt:-::r?? ·:Rijfi9# t 
Fry (1978) 0.2 7 LOC's 1962-72 
Giovannini (1983) 0.0 7 LOC's 1964-80 
Campbell & Mankiw (1991) 0.0 5 MOC's 1957-88 
Barro (1992) 0.6 10 MOC's 1957-90 
AVERAGE 0.2 
Source: Gylfason (1993). 

NB: os/or denotes the effect on the saving rate of an increase in the interest rate r by one percentage point. nle 

values of os/or were computed from estimates of elasticities by assuming s=O. 1 and r=0.04 when representative 

values of s and r were not presented or deri ved from a study. 

The results from the table above indicate elasticities lower on average than Ogaki et 
aI's sample. It is notable, however, that the interest elasticity for the middle developed 
countries was greater than the less developed countries. 
Table 1.5: Interest elasticity ofsaving: developed countries (United States) 
···· .<t. t.) .... : :iir: :,l);QdHH;$W :'U :::):i;::; :; ;; :::,:::'t: .:.::::. 
Wright (1967,1969) 

Taylor (1971) 

Heien (1972) 

Juster & Wachtel (1972) 

Blinder (1975) 

Boskin (1978) 

Howrey & Hymans (1978) 

Blinder (1981) 

Gylfason (1981) 

Mankiw (1981) 

Carlino (1982) 

Friend & Hasbrouck (1983) 

Blinder & Oeaton (1985) 

Mankiw et a/ (1985) 

Montomery (1986) 

Baum (1988) 

Caml2bell & Mankiw ~1989} 

~$!$d t::::.H :/: :::>{·: ¢*iirlJi;Y:.H&tftf;;;· R~ti.P'q ,) 
0.0 U:::iA 1ts8 (-1 808 
2.0 USA 1953-69 
4.4 USA 1948-69 
0.7 USA 1954-72 
0.0 USA 1949-72 
0.7 USA 1929-69 
0.0 USA 1951-74 
0.0 USA 1953-77 
0.7 USA 1952-78 
0.0 USA 1948-80 
0.0 USA 1957-78 
0.0 USA 1932-80 
0.0 USA 1954-84 
0.5 USA 1950-81 
0.0 USA 1953-82 
0.0 USA 1952-82 
0.0 USA 1953-85 
AVERAGE 0.56 
Source: Gylfason ( 1993). 

NB: os/or denotes the effect on Ule saving rate of an increase in Ule interest rat e r by one percentage point. nle 

values of os/or were computed from estimates of elJ!,1icities by assuming s=O.1 and r=0.04 when representati ve 

values of sand r were not presented or deri ved from a s1udy. 

The results from Table 1.5 accord with the findings of Ogaki et af (1996) on average, 
but 10 of the studies in the United States could not identify a positive relationship. 
The differences are probably due to different methodological approaches . Most 
studies have used a Life Cycle approach, whereas Ogaki et af adopt a two-good 
framework that distinguishes between traded and non-traded goods . They estimate the 
intratemporal elasticity between traded and non-traded goods, and the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution . The responsiveness of the saving rate to changes in the real 
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available. Therefore, individuals may not be able to respond to changes in the interest 
rate, even if they wanted 10 because their funds are ' tied-up' in a contractual scheme. 
In other words, a second liquidity constraint exists. 
As reflected in Figure 1.2 the return on bank deposits has been historically inferior to 
retirement funds . Thus, the inherent positive interest elasticity of saving, if it exists, 
will be low because the return on discretionary saving has been lower relative to 
contractual saving. In other words, individuals have not been responsive to changes in 
the interest rate in the past because they could obtain superior tax-free returns in a 
contractual scheme. 
The rest of this section examines the empirical results of interest elasticity estimation in 
South Africa. 
Wilkins (1993) conducted a study into financial repression in South Africa He tested 
a saving function based on Fry (1978). The model was of the following form : 
~ - {+ + + S ( + J } y -/ g,y,d-rc ' , ;, ~ _, 
where 
Sd 
= real savinglGDP ratio, 
Y 
g = real growth rate in GDP, 
y = real GDP per capita, 
d-17f! = real rate of return on money, 
Sf 
= foreign saving ratio (real trade balance/real GDP). 
y 
The variable which is of interest to this study is the measure of the real rate of return 
on money, or the ex ante real interest rate. In estimating expected inflation (17f!) 
Wilkins assumed the South African financial market can accurately predict the inflation 
rate at the beginning of the period. This suggests that the actual rate of inflation is 
27 
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A recent study by Pretorius and Knox (1995) analysed the consumption equations used 
in the Reserve Bank's macro-econometric modeL As a starting point, they plotted the 
real interest rate with changes in real private consumption expenditure on durable 
goods. Their initial conclusion was that "a fairly strong lagged inverse relationship 
exists between changes in the real interest rate and changes in real private consumption 
expenditure on durable goods. This seems to indicate that the substitution effect of 
changes in the cost of credit dominates the income effect of changes in the interest 
rate" (pps.35,36). The results of the authors' econometric results confirmed these 
initial findings. The real interest rate was negatively related to consumption with an 
elasticity of around 0.02. Based on simulation exercises their conclusion was that 
"private consumption expenditure can be expected to decline by R500 million 
current prices), or by 0.2 percent with an increase of one percentage point in interest 
rates" (pAO)26 
Two criticisms of this study regarding the choice of the interest rate variable are worth 
mentioning. Firstly, they use a prime lending rate which is essentially testing whether 
consumption is related to costs of borrowing rather than to returns on saving. 
Whether this is their intention is unclear as earlier in their paper (p. 35) they discuss 
how changes in the interest rate can affect saving in terms of income and substitution 
effects. Secondly, the interest rate was not adjusted for taxes. The after-tax interest 
rate is significantly different from the pre-tax return. The implicit assumption that the 
authors are making is that consumers do not consider the effects of taxes on their 
return to saving, which may not be a reasonable assumption.27 On the other hand, 
other studies have not considered tax effects (e.g. Blinder, 1975). But as Sandmo 
(1985) notes, "while earlier studies used nominal before-tax rates of interest, the 
increases in both the rate of inflation and marginal tax rates have made it important to 
use some measure of real after-tax rate of return" (p.282). Other criticisms of their 
analysis are dealt with in chapter three. 
26 This conclusion does not include the impact interest rate changes would have on real income due to changing 
home mortgage commitments. 
27 Using nominal interest rates assumes money illusion exists. 
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2.5. Empirical modelling 
The discussion above has shown the close similarity between the LCH and the PIH. 
Either model can be specified to capture pension fund behaviour. Feldstein (1974) 
refers to this as the "extended life-cycle model". As discussed in chapter one, pension 
saving affects an individual's saving through two offsetting forces . The first is the 
wealth effect whereby saving is reduced because the expectation of future pension 
benefits reduces the need to accumulate assets for retirement. The second is because 
of social security inducing earlier retirement. To retire earlier requires a higher saving 
rate during the individual's working life. 
The net effect on saving depends on the strength of these two forces . Which effect is 
stronger must be determined empirically. 
The model employed in this study to investigate the relative strengths of the wealth and 
retirement effects is based on Feldstein (1974) . From chapter one, the specification of 
the consumption function is of the form : 
Cr = a+~I.r: +~2REr +y/r; +Y 2P fy; +y 3Rr (2-1) 
where: 

Cr is consumer expenditure; 

Yr is permanent income; 

Wr is the stock of household wealth at the end of year t (excluding social security 

wealth); 

REr is corporate retained earnings; 

P Wr is retirement fund wealth; 

Rr is the real interest rate. 

Additional variables were incorporated into the model. The next section explains the 

rationale for including additional explanatory variables, and discusses measurement 

issues regarding the data. 

35 
. 
. 
. 
: 
 
t 
t  
t
t 
t 
. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapler Iwo: Modelling Saving 
2.6. Explanatory variables: theoretical and 
measurement issues 
2.6.1 Theoretical issues 
2.6.1.1 Wealth (W) 
Wealth is a crucial determinant of saving under the Life Cycle hypothesis. The LCH 
predicts that with given expected income, an increase in current real wealth decreases 
the share of current disposable income saved because it provides a greater lifetime 
consumption level. Thus, wealth is hypothesised to be positively related to 
consumption. The coefficient on wealth in the consumption function can be 
interpreted as the marginal propensity to consume wealth. 
2.6.1.2 Retained earnings (RE) 
Retained earnings is included to ascertain the relationship between personal and 
corporate saving. The literature on the structural relationship between corporate and 
personal saving has focused on answering the question of whether households ' pierce 
the corporate veil' . Since retained earnings produce future income flows, a household 
that completely pierces the veil takes business saving into consideration in its lifetime 
consumption decision. This can cause corporate and household saving to be inversely 
related . 
The inverse relationship between corporate and household saving was first observed by 
Denison (1958), and later supported by David and Scadding (1974). Feldstein (1973) 
and Feldstein and Fane (1973) agree that corporate saving is a substitute for household 
saving, but it is an imperfect substitute. They show that an increase in corporate 
saving is only partially offset by decreases in household saving. Feldstein estimated the 
marginal propensity to consume retained earnings in the United States to be 0.5. The 
marginal propensity to consume disposable income was 0.75. Therefore, if the 
corporate sector saves 1 dollar, (which means the household forgoes 1 dollar in 
disposable income) then total saving should increase by 25 cents. In other words, if 
the marginal propensity to consume disposable income is greater than the marginal 
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confidence by raising uncertainty regarding future income. The third is because 
inflation reduces consumption of households with relatively high debt because of 
liquidity constraints. This is because the inflation premium in nominal rates forces 
these households to accelerate the repayment of their real debt. Bovenberg and Evans 
(1990) claim empirical studies which have assumed a fixed real after-tax rate of return 
have found that inflation significantly raises saving. 
It comes as no surprise that the theoretical ambiguity regarding the effect of inflation 
on the saving rate has led to mixed empirical results . As Kauffman (1995:49) notes, 
whereas a negative sign is generally regarded as reasonable, a positive coefficient must 
be attributed to greater macroeconomic uncertainty causing increased saving. 
2.6.1.5 The budget deficit (DEF) 
The rationale for using the government budget deficit in the consumption function is to 
test the Ricardian Equivalence theorem. For the theorem to hold, a tax cut leading to 
an increase in the budget deficit will induce individuals to increase their saving in order 
to meet future tax increases. Strict acceptance of Ricardian Equivalence implies a 
coefficient on DEF equal to unity. 
2.6.2 Measurement issues 
2.6.2.1 Consumption (C) 
There is widespread debate over what consumption measure to use . Some researchers 
use purchases of nondurable goods and services as the proxy for consumption 
expenditure. Durable goods are excluded because the actual consumption of these 
goods does not occur at the time of purchase but is spread over the life of the good. 
Ideally one would like to measure the flow of services from durable goods and 
nondurable goods and services. Bovenberg and Evans (1990) do not adjust for 
durable purchases because "an overall consumer expenditure function may better 
represent the data and have superior predictive power compared with a disaggregated 
approach" (p.657). 
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derivation of household wealth used in this paper warrants a detailed explanation. This 
is given in sections 2.2.6.3 . I. I and 2.6.2.3.1 .2. 
2.6.2.3.1.1 Housing wealth (Hw) 
To estimate housing wealth, volume and price indicators were required. The volume 
indicator was the number of dwellings from the 1991 census rated back by the 
movement in gross domestic fixed investment of residential buildings from the SARB 
Bulletin. This series was multiplied by average house prices to derive a current price 
series for gross housing wealth. The housing price series used was from Prinsloo 
(1994)30 The total value of mortgage loans on dwellings and flats was subtracted 
from this series to arrive at net housing wealth. Current price housing wealth was 
deflated by the CPI to obtain real housing wealth. 
2.6.2.3.1.2 Non-pension financial wealth 
Non-pension financial wealth was more difficult to estimate. There is a lack of data on 
the stock of assets and liabilities in South Africa at a household level. There is, 
however, adequate information on flows of funds between various financial 
instruments. The total deposits of individuals at financial institutions is available from 
the SARB Bulletin. Unfortunately, this series only dates back to 1991. Therefore the 
1991 stock was rated back using movements in net household flows to the banking 
sector (i.e. deposits less credit). Adequate data on the stock of non-mortgage 
liabilities are not available?l Therefore, the final series for non-pension financial 
of wealth among living persons using !he reciprocal of mortality tables. Using this approach, McGrath derived 
an estimate for !he wealth of households for 1975 . His results are shown in the following table: 
> : A9~ :OOsF : ... •• :; ... •••••.:••••• w.~!.~; .·.>.:..·< .·. > : <·. ···iW¢~i:i#t~:·M::·:::·:·••{:.:}}) . ~ian > ' ,{:· ··· :~;.;::·: \:Wi!,ght~i:(~ij~hlge•• kW 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
20-29 8,828 2,873 707 0 1,111 113 6,958 
30-39 17,116 7,028 615 495 2,055 334 15,575 
40-49 14,030 6,795 1,246 731 3,511 4,662 15,005 
50-64 24,837 12,914 2,453 890 8,457 6,133 28,981 
65+ 36,959 19,678 883 330 7,264 1,995 42,034 
The table is consistent with the life-cycle theory in that wealth i.ncreases as people near retirement. However, 
the table does show a sizeable discrepancy in wealth by race. TIus is not in keeping with the LCH which 
assumes each household has identical consumption and saving behaviour. The problem with usi.ng estate duty 
revenue is that the tax is payable only on estates greater than R 1,000,000. Because of this it is likely that 
there is significant tax avoidance by gil1ing or establishing trusts, thereby reducing the amount payable on 
death. Ideally one would like to obtain the total value of estates by age group and then extrapolate across the 
population. Unfortunately estate data is not readily obtainable. 
30 I am grateful to Vivien Ferguson from ABSA Bank for providing the latest prices. 
31 A series of outstanding domestic credit is available. However, this also includes businesses so would overstate 
the true credit owed by households. 
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divided by total pension fund members to obtain real pension wealth per member. The 
source for this series is the Mouton Report (1992), updated by the Report of the 
Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of Retirement Provision in South Africa 
(1995) (The Smith Commission). 
2.6.2.4 Retained earnings (RE) 

Retained earnings was calculated as corporate saving (including provision for 

depreciation) from the national accounts. The source of the series is various issues of 

the SARB Bulletin. 

2.6.2.5 Return on saving 
Most studies use an interest rate variable to proxy the return on saving. The choice of 
the appropriate nominal interest rate is subject to a measurement problem. In reality 
I 
different borrowing and lending rates are observed. In most empirical research, 
judgement is used as to the choice of the interest rate. Blinder (1975) chose a 
weighted average of rates of return on time deposits paid by financial institutions. 
Other studies use annual rates of return computed as income from assets divided by 
asset value. 
There has also been debate over whether to use real interest rates or tax-adjusted real 
interest rates. High and increasing marginal tax rates in South Africa has made it 
important to consider the use of real tax-adjusted returns. This study uses both a pre 
and post-tax measure, to identify any difference in their impact on saving. The real 
pre-tax interest rate is denoted as R, while the tax-adjusted real interest rate is RT. The 
real interest rate was calculated as the nominal interest rate on a one year fixed deposit 
less the growth rate in the consumer price index. The tax rate on interest income was 
extracted from Prinsloo (1994). 
A relative return variable (RR) was also used to measure the intra-elasticity of personal 
saving. This variable was calculated as the real (post-tax) return from one year fixed 
deposits less the return from retirement funds. Thus, RR can be interpreted as the 
premium (positive or negative) from investing in a discretionary saving scheme. This 
variable is included to test the hypothesis that the relative interest elasticity of saving is 
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low because households are liquidity constrained, i.e. their contractual commitments 
limit their flexibility to change their personal saving portfolios. 
2.6.2.6 Unemployment (U) . 
There is much debate in South Africa as to the correct measure of unemployment . 
Registered unemployment figures are considerably lower than other measures, such as 
subtracting the total economically active population from the total number employed. 34 
However, econometric estimation is concerned with movements over time. Therefore, 
if movements in alternative unemployment series are comparable then it should not 
matter which measure is used. Figure 3.1 examines three measures of unemployment . 
These are: total economically active less total employment (UN),35 registered 
unemployed from the Central Statistical Service (RU), and registered unemployed from 
the SARB Bulletin (RBRU). 
Figure 3.1 Rates ofchange in unemployment measures in South Africa: 1961-1995 
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The Reserve Bank series is only available from 1984. UN and RU had the same 
movements until 1971 . Since 1971, RU was more volatile than UN. Therefore it 
could be argued that empirical estimation will be sensitive to the choice of 
34 Subtracting total employment from the labour force includes individuals not teclmically classified as 
unemployed, such as those not actively seeking work. 
35 Total employment data was provided by A. Roulens and D Viljoen from the South African Development Bank. 
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Chapter three 
Empirical Ana'lysis of the Personal Saving 

Model 

Empirical results of the personal saving model outlined in chapter two are presented in 
this chapter. The principal objectives of the estimation were to determine the extent 
that pension funds influence saving behaviour, and the responsiveness of personal 
saving to changes in interest rates. The results show that retirement funds in South 
Africa have had a small negative influence on total saving. Evidence is also provided 
supporting the hypothesis that policy measures designed to stimulate saving by 
increasing the interest rate will be impotent. The chapter begins by discussing the 
econometric methodology and presenting results of the analysis. A discussion then 
follows on the implications of the findings regarding personal saving 
3.1. Empirical testing methodology 
This section provides an overview of the econometric techniques used to estimate the 
model specified in chapter two (equation 2-1). The issue of stationarity is presented 
first, followed by a discussion on cointegration. 
3.1.1 Stationarity and unit roots 
When modelling time series data, econometric techniques rely on the assumption that 
the process generating the data is stationary36 In economics, many series do not meet 
the stationarity assumption. Series tend to change often dramatically as a result of 
behavioural or policy changes. 
Modelling non-stationary series can lead to a spurious relationshi p37 The implication 
for regression diagnostics is significant. Hendry (1986) cited in McDermott (1990) 
36 TIlis is where the underlying stochastic process that gem:rates the series is assumed to be invariant with 
respect to time. 
37 For an example of a spurious regression see Hendry (1980). 
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38 So called because OLS estimates converge in probability to true parameters at a faster rate than in the usual 
ca~e. Also, the results imply that measurement error, and 
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Table 3.1 Long-run model coefficients 
0.659 -0 .001 -0 .001 33.481 0.138 
0.760 0.002 0.016 24.633 0.243 
933.858 0.610 0.002 -0.004 49.710 0.180 27.49 
0.708 0.005 0.013 41 .956 0.282 28 .69 
669.666 0.611 -0.006 -0 .132 36.823 0.093 21.056 58 .720 
0.662 0.009 -0 .009 24.958 0.099 17.923 93 .32 
NB: Y is real per capita disposable income, W is real per capita wealth. PH' is real social security benefits per fund member, INFL is 
the inflation rate, RE is real per capita retained eamings, R is the real pre-!.1.:>: interest rate, and DEF is tlle bu dget defi c it as a 
percen!'1.ge ofOOP. 
The sign of Wand PW depends on the specification of the model. The sign of the real 
interest rate (R) is surprising because this suggests that the wealth effect of changes in 
the interest rate outweighs the substitution effect. The implied long-run elasticities at 
means are shown in the following table: 
Table 3.2: Long-run elasticities 
i eg'tiiltHdil ,t:? ::Y ::j;: 0t ;,?i PW:?;::::i::;,{ .·.·JNFI:W},) ::,::}:i:': R'~: ::'}H ;:;:;:;:} Hi+RtMi:irWH/:QEp:; '> 
(1) 0.701 -0.008 -0.004 0.065 0.003 
(2) 0.808 0.015 0.064 0.046 0.060 
(3) 0.649 0.015 -0 .016 0.097 0.045 
(4) 0.753 0.038 0.052 0.081 0.070 
(5) 0.650 -0.046 -0 .528 0.072 0.023 
(6) 0.704 0.069 -0 .036 0.048 0.025 
0.004 
0.005 
0.003 
0.003 
Elasti c ity equals the long-run coeffi cient of the variable multiplied by the ratio of the mean of the variabl e di vided by mean 
consumpti on. 
0.117 
0.085 
The results of augmented Dickey Fuller tests on the residuals (adjusted in line with 
MacKinnon, 1991) and diagnostic tests are given in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Residual unit root tests 
,:..l$qWlfIQo ·: lt~gJengnf ~: :::i t;:: H\<}::<:}UH>t&:::l:im}: :'i): :: t::"F+,: 
(1) -3 .71** -3 .57** -3.64* 
(2) -3 .51*** -3.47** -3.52* 
(3) -4.84* -4 .81* -4.90* 
(4) -4.36* -4.42* -4.50* 
(5) -4 .87* -4 .87* -4.96* 
(6) -4 .88* -4 .95* -5.03* 
• denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level 
•• denotes rej ection oftlle null hypothesis at the 5 percent le vel. 
••• denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 pe rcent level. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in all equations. The' t' value also 
increases as more independent variables are added . Based on these results, 
cointegration exists between the hypothesised long-run variables. Diagnostic tests are 
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The analysis of Pretorious and Knox (1995) is also questionable because they use the t 
statistics and R2 as verification of the adequacy of their model. As already noted, the 
R2, t, and F tests are meaningless in the first step of cointegration estimation. They 
argue, incorrectly, that the reason the R 2 in their long-run equations is greater than in 
the short-run equations is because of the large fluctuations in the short-run time series. 
In fact the reason the R 2 is so high in the long-run equations is because a regression of 
non-stationary variables causes the R 2 to tend to I. No other diagnostic tests for serial 
correlation or heteroskedasticity were carried out by Pretorious & Knox. Thus, the 
reliability of their consumption model (and the Reserve Bank's) must be questioned. 
In summary, support is given for the adequacy of equation (6). However, there are 
econometric problems with the remaining equations. Most importantly, the EG 
method is questionable when more than two variables are modelled. Therefore, the 
Johansen method should be adopted. The results from this estimation are given in the 
next section. 
3.2.1.2 Johansen method 
Estimates of the model (i.e. f3 from Appendix A) with consumption as the normalised 
variable are given in the following table. 
Table 3.5: Normalised coefficients 
(1 ) 5059.540 0.954 0.016 0.149 3.176 
213.050 (1.75) 
(-1.43) 
(2) 2952.620 0.809 0.013 0.107 2.349 
( 4.17) (1.86) (2 .14) 154.274 (2.28) 
(-1 .71) 
(3) 830.510 0.767 0.053 -40.344 0.942 
(7.99) (279) (-1.57) (3.28) 
(4) 0.581 0.008 0.018 53.589 0.520 71 .254 
(9.81 ) (4.40) (2 .36) (4.74) (4.59) (6 .32) 
(5) 1151 .269 0.723 0.013 0.019 1.164 118.100 
(6 .30) (2.15) (0 .85) (3.15) (2.90) 
(6) 0.827 0.012 -0 .077 1.146 232.448 
(4 .00) (1.32 (1 .23) (1.83) (1.696) 
(7) 0.636 0.018 -0 .077 0.165 -0.475 18.466 300.760 
(2 .12) (11.69) (-6 .67) (0.02) (-4.79) (4.42) (9.99) 
NB: the sample period was 1960-1995. Yis real per capita disposable income, Wis real per capita wealth, PWis real social security 
benefits per fund member, [NFL is the inflation rate, RE is real per capita retained earnings, R is the real pre-tax interest rate , and DEF 
is the budgd deficit as a percentag~ ofGDP. 
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44 the coefficient in equation (J on PW suggests that individuals consume 15 percent of 
wealth each year. TIle coefficient on retained suggests that every rand saved the 
corporate sector encourages individuals to consume an additional RJ.I 8, which is cit:arly unsustaillable. 
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residual was 0.04 (0.98) which is satisfactory. A histogram of the residuals is given in 
Appendix B. Accepting (4) implies the following long-run elasticities (calculated at 
means); 
Table 3.6: Long-run elasticities - equation (4) 
Elasticity equals the long-run codficienl of the variable multiplied by the ratio of the mean oflhe variable divided by mean 
consumption. 
Therefore, equation (4) is the best specification available given the data. The model's 
performance is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Real per capita consumption in South Africa: 1960-1995 - actual and 
estimated 
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The fit is reasonably good except for outliers in 1985 and 1987. Dummy variables to 
allow for these outliers could not be modelled because the Johansen method requires 
additional observations as more variables are added. The correlation between actual 
and fitted values was 0.96 which is satisfactory. 
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3.2.2 The short-run consumption function 
As discussed earlier, when using the Johansen technique the short-run is modelled 
using a vector error-correction 'model (VECM). Two cointegrating equations were 
produced from equation (4), one of which was due to the inclusion ofa stationary 
variable, i.e. one cointegrating vectors contains just a single variable (R). Because of 
this, short-run consumption behaviour can be modelled using a single-equation error 
correction model (ECM). The error correction term can be defined as follows; 
(;/ =O.58JYt +O.008Wr + O.OJ8PWr + 53. 589INFLt + O.520REt + 7l.25-1Rt 
(9.8 1) (4.40) (2.36) (./ . 7-1) (./.59) (6.32) 
z/./=c./-(; I-I 
A general to specific procedure was applied to arrive at a final model. The results of 
the estimation using OLS are shown in Table 3.7 . 
Table 3. 7: Estimation results of (ECM) 
IMYt 0.236 0.170 
(3.59) (2.56) 
Int.Yt_1 0.219 0.240 
(3.40) (3.07) 
R t -0 .002 
(-1 .96) 
ZI-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0 .000 
(-1.84) (-1.05) (-0.46) 
Int.Wt 0.088 0.093 0.095 
(4.44) (5.62) (4.94) 
t.Ut -0 .003 -0.010 -0.009 
(-2 .94) (-5.40) (-7.14) 
InDEFt_1 0.006 0.010 0.009 
(3 .93) (6.87) (4.33) 
t.RTt 0.002 
(0.78) 
RRt 0.000 
(0 .64) 
NB: In .dY, is the annual log growth rale in real per capita disposable income, In L1C, is lhe annual log 
growth rate in real per capita consumption., R, is the real pre-tax inlere,1 rale, 2,_1 is the lagged residual from 
the long-run model (4), InL1W, is the annual log growth rale in per capita real non-pension wealth, L1U, is the 
first difterence in the rale of unemployment, Mr, is the change in the real after-tax interest rate, RR, is the 
relalive relum 10 discrelionary saving, and InDEF,_, is lhe log of the budgel deficil as a p"fcentagc ofGDP. 
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Equation (1) determines the interest elasticity of the real pre-tax interest rate. 
Equations (2) and (3) were estimated to ascertain whether using the real after-tax 
interest rate, or the relative return to discretionary saving respectively, affected the size 
or the statistical significance 'of the elasticity. 
When the after-tax return on saving was modelled, the coefficient changed sign but 
remained low and insignificant. The change in sign is probably due to a small sample 
size. To test this, equation (1) was estimated over the 1971-1995 sample period, and 
produced a positive coefficient on Rr. 
Following Pretorius and Knox (1994), a dummy variable was included to capture the 
effects of the introduction of GST in 1978 and the subsequent increase in 1984 but was 
statistically insignificant. The reason for its insignificance is probably because of the 
effects of the tax being smoothed over the year. If quarterly or monthly data was used , 
then one would expect the effects of the tax to have an impact. 
The ECMs were put through the usual battery of test. The results of these tests are 
given below. 
Table 3.8: EClY/ evaluation diagnostics 
.. .......,............ . ........ . ,f:,:": ' · ·: ~·· :~·:;i,;:\l=i .):/; ·(1)iti@':'ff:tf{ft::,::::::::)}=m: (2)::m:m::'i(}:::::;::t:::\::i::H:'::(::::Y:: )($f mi::; > '" 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.78 0.77 
F statistic F(6.27) 13.06 [0 .00] F(617) 14.95 [0 .00] F(6 17) 15.09 [0.00] 
DW 1.86 1.45 1.47 
ARCH LM test F(I.33) 0.07 [0 .79] F(I .23) 0.03 [0 .86] F(I.23) 0 .13 [0.91] 
White test (no cross terms) F(13. 21 ) 0.66 [0 .78] F(13.11) 0 .68 [0 .75] F(1311 ) 1.59 [0.23] 
Serial correlation LM test F(925) 0.04 [0 .96] F(9. 15) 0.52 [0 .69] F(915)0.63 [0.55] 
Ramsey's RESET test F(10.24) 0.87 [0.47] F(9.15) 0 .96 [0.44}. F(9, 15) 1.08 [0.39] 
Ljung-Box test F(4,34) 6 .18 [0.19] F(4.23) 2 .38 [0 .67] F(4,23) 3.69 [0.45] 
Wald test 134.79 [0.00] 156.66 [0 .00] 164.65 [0 .00] 
Jargue-Bera test 0.78 [0.68] 0.72 [0 .70] 0.00 [0 .99] 
Sample 1960-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 
Tests for serial correlation or heteroskedasticity were insignificant. Other tests for 
specification error, and non-normal residuals were also insignificant. The size of the 
adjusted R2 suggests the explanatory power of model (1) in particular could be 
improved . However, the Ramsey test for specification error was insignificant. To test 
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the stability of the model, i.e. whether structural change occurred in any of the 
coefficients, recursive estimation was applied to each short-run model. The results are 
given in Appendix B. The recursive residuals were stable for equation (I), but 
displayed excess variability in equations (2) and (3). This is indicated by the residuals 
exceeding the two standard deviation band. This suggests that there is some parameter 
instability in the equation. This may explain the change in sign of the interest elasticity 
in equations (2) and (3). As an additional check on the stability of equation (I), the 
recursive coefficients were calculated . These are also shown in Appendix B. The plots 
of the estimates do not suggest instability of the coefficients. 
In conclusion, equation (1) is the best representation of the short-run behaviour of 
consumption based on the diagnostic tests and forecasting ability. Equations (2) and 
(3) suffer from poor sample size which significantly affects the stability of the results 
and the sign of the interest elasticity of saving. Because of this, more weight should be 
placed on the results of equation (1). Nevertheless, the low and insignificant 
coefficients on the interest elasticity of saving in equations (2) and (3) support the 
results of equation (1). A plot of the model based on equation (1) is given in the 
following graph. 
Figure 3.2: Real per capita consumption growth: 1960-1995 - actual and estimated 
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Therefore, the suggestion that wealth has not been a major determinant of saving is not 
surprising given the age structure of the population. 
3.3.4 Retained earnifJgs 
Retained earnings were statistically significant in the long-run equations, and positively 
related to consumption as expected. From the Johansen long-run equation (4), the 
marginal propensity to consume disposable income was 0.58, while the marginal 
propensity to consume retained earnings was 0.52, Thus, if corporations save an extra 
rand (which reduces disposable income by a rand), total private saving will increase by 
around 6 cents. This suggests that individuals do see through the corporate veil almost 
perfectly, 
3.3.5 Error-correction term 
The error-correction term (2) was statistically significant (at the 1 °percent level) with 
a negligible coefficient. The statistical significance supports the robustness of the 
framework used,46 but the size of the coefficient is sur rising, The coefficient implies 
that consumers react very slowly to changes in the underlying equilibrium relationship, 
In other words, consumers remove virtually none of the disequilibrium each year. 
3.3.6 Ricardian equivalence 
The budget deficit (DEF) was incorrectly signed in the long-run models with 
coefficients ranging between 0,59 and 300,76, However, the budget deficit did 
statistically impact on personal saving in the short-run, although it was incorrectly 
signed, The low coefficient implies that as the budget deficit increases, individuals 
decrease their saving only slightly. Nevertheless, this result is in stark contrast to the 
Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, 
3.3.7 Pension wealth 
The sign of the coefficient on pension fund wealth depended on the specification of the 
long-run model. However, it was positively related to consumption in equation (4) of 
46 Based on Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado ( 1992), 
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where PWis funded pension wealth, MPCPIV is the marginal propensity to consume 
funded pension wealth, and MPCw is the marginal propensity to consume non-pension 
wealth. Table 3.9 shows the net decrease in saving using this calculation. 
Table 3.9: The effect ofretirement funds on saving 
1960 47,850 48 200 1,127 24.0 4.3 
1961 47,926 48 441 1,309 10.9 3.7 
1962 48,009 48 565 1,410 8.5 3.4 
1963 48,089 48 486 1,614 9.9 3.0 
1964 48,202 48 328 1,646 14 .6 2.9 
1965 48,312 48 370 1,699 13.0 2.8 
1966 48,452 48 521 1,902 9.2 2.5 
1967 48,600 49 585 2,248 8.4 2.2 
1968 48,796 49 730 2,500 6.7 2.0 
1969 48,987 49 523 2,576 9.4 1.9 
1970 49,196 49 509 2,569 9.6 1.9 
1971 52,065 52 1,016 3,119 5.1 1.7 
1972 52,670 53 1,220 3,849 4.3 1.4 
1973 53,438 53 800 4,826 6.6 1 .1 
1974 54,334 54 991 6,032 5.4 0.9 
1975 55,152 55 1,513 6,761 3.6 0.8 
1976 56,739 57 841 6,902 6.8 0.8 
1977 58,778 59 2,213 9,151 2.7 0.6 
1978 60,263 60 1,608 10,602 3.7 0.6 
1979 63,285 63 3,013 14,757 2.1 0.4 
1980 67,398 67 3,771 21,163 1.8 0.3 
1981 72,263 72 801 19,369 9.0 0.4 
1982 76,284 76 774 16,735 9.8 0.5 
1983 82,872 83 916 23,177 9.1 0.4 
1984 92,004 92 2,707 44,177 3.4 0.4 
1985 101,240 101 4,448 30,189 2.3 0.3 
1986 115,022 115 2,581 33,711 4.5 0.3 
1987 132,089 132 4,500 37,586 2.9 0.4 
1988 146,481 146 4,619 45,411 3.2 0.3 
1989 164,395 164 4,758 54,301 3.4 0.3 
1990 196,125 196 1,764 53,958 11 .1 0.4 
1991 231,516 231 3,613 58,535 6.4 0.4 
1992 275,977 276 8,963 58,043 3.1 0.5 
1993 327,149 327 12,768 65,885 2.6 0.5 
1994 379,824 380 11,949 74,390 3.2 0.5 
1995 394,989 395 6,031 · 81,038 6.5 0.5 
AVERAGE 6.9 1.3 
NB: Tolal personal saving excludes provision for deprecialion. If saving are adjusted for deprecialion, the average effecl falls lO 
around 2 percenl of lolal saving. 
The plausibility of the assumption in the table above that in the absence of pension 
funds, savers would substitute the equivalent contributions to a self-managed scheme 
depends on the stage of life of the individual. Recall from chapter two that the Life­
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Therefore the reduction in disposable income because of the tax and wealth effects of 
unfunded pensions means that the fall in saving is likely to be greater than the figures 
given in the table. Secondly, pension fund mismanagement may be offset by a 
reduction in the marginal propensity to consume non-pension wealth because the 
future certainty of total household wealth is reduced. Finally, there is no way of 
measuring a, thus the estimates above are as accurate as possible given the available 
information. 
The results produced in Table 3.9 contradict empirical results reviewed in chapter one. 
Funded retirement funds have decreased total personal saving. The results indicate 
that personal saving would be approximately 7 percent greater on average in the 
absence of funded pension funds. 
3.3.8 Interest elasticity of saving 
The results from the long-run models indicate a negative interest-elasticity of saving of 
between 0.004 and 0.01. This implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the interest 
rate will have very little effect on saving. These estimates are lower in magnitude to 
Pretorious & Knox's (1995) estimates, and different in sign. Their estimates of the 
interest elasticity ranged from 0.016 to 0.02. 
The results from the error correction models were generally the opposite: changes in 
the interest rate are positively related to saving. The interest elasticity is low: around 
zero to 0.002 in absolute terms. As noted earlier, care should be taken when 
interpreting the sign of the return on saving in ECM (2) because of the small sample 
size. It is likely that the small sample size has lead to the change in sign. Therefore, 
the sign ofRT should be ignored. Note that the absolute size of the elasticity does not 
increase greatly if the real after-tax interest rate, or the relative return to saving are 
used. It is interesting that this elasticity is significantly lower than would be expected 
based on Ogaki et al (1996). Their results suggested that a I percent increase in the 
interest rate would increase the saving rate by around 0.6 percent. However, as noted 
elsewhere, a different methodology was employed in their paper which may account 
for the differences. However, the results are generally similar to other studies 
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reviewed in chapter one which adopted the LCH approach. Thus, changes in 
consumption are influenced by income rather than interest rate changes. 
As outlined in chapter one, a·likely cause of the low elasticity is the high degree of 
contractual saving in South Africa. If households are committed to contractual saving 
schemes, they are unable to respond to changes in the real interest rate unless they 
have real income growth which provides additional resources to invest in a 
discretionary scheme. This is unlikely to have occurred in South Africa because of 
declining real income growth,47 and because there has been no incentive to invest in a 
discretionary scheme because of the low after-tax rate of return relative to that offered 
by contractual schemes. The high degree of liquidity constraint is reflected in the 
relative return elasticity which is lower than the interest elasticity of saving i.e. 
consumers can respond little to changes in the relative return to discretionary saving. 
The policy implications and conclusions based on the results are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
, 
47 	Real disposable income growth averaged 1.5 percent over the 1970s, 0.1 percent over the 1980s, and 0 percent 
from 1990 until 1995. 
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Consequently, if an inherent positive relationship exists between personal saving 
and 	budget deficits, it is being distorted by fiscal drag reducing disposable income 
and therefore personal savil)g. 
5. 	 The econometric analysis showed that shifting I rand worth of taxes from firms to 
individuals would increase personal saving by 6 cents. 
6. 	 Inflation is negatively related to personal saving in South Africa. 
The policy implications that arise from these conclusions are given in the following 
section. 
4.2. Policy implications 
4.2.1 Macroeconomic policy 
A strong theme throughout the paper, and supported by the data, is that real income is 
a key determinant of saving growth. Given that there are feedbacks between saving 
and economic growth, saving is also a key determinant of growth . This suggests that 
measures, other than those which affect saving, need to be introduced which stimulate 
economic growth. A recent positive initiative in this area is the Growth, Employment, 
and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy. 
The analytical conclusions also provide justification for an anti-inflationary monetary 
policy stance. If inflation continues to decline, then (among other economic benefits) 
personal saving should increase. 
4.2.2 Fiscal policy 
4.2.2.1 Saving incentives 
The results in the previous chapter imply that the argument against providing saving 
incentives because of a low interest elasticity of saving must be put in perspective. The 
findings of Wilkins (1993) were used by the Katz Commission (1994) to conclude that 
it is "doubtful whether interest rates are important determinants of aggregate personal 
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regarding the government's commitment to creating a stable economic environment. 
This will help attract foreign direct investment necessary to complement domestic 
saving, and finance capital inputs essential for economic development. 
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Appendix A 
The Johansen method 
The Johansen method can best be explained using an example. Following Holden and 
Thompson (1990), a simple consumption-income dynamic model with 2 lags, produces 
the following system : 
c= TI IICI _ I + fII 2 J:-I + fI 13 C _ 2 + TI I4 J: -2 + !ll + EllI 	 I 
y= TI 1I C _ I + TI 22 J:-I + 	 fI 23 C _ 2 + TI::4J: -2 + !l2 + E21 
(A-l) 
I I	 I 
where it is assumed that C and YI are 1(1). Expressing these equations in error­
correction form gives the following : 
0 12 	 (0 12 + 0 14 )tJ.C I ] = [-(1- 011) ][tJ.CI _ I] +[-(1- 011 - 013) :[CI _ 2 ] + [/-1-1] + [c: 1I ][tJ.~ ° 21 -(1- 0 22 ) tJ.~ _1 (0 21 + 0 23 ) -(1- 022 - 024) YI -2 /-1- 2 C: 21 
(A-2) 
Rewriting this equation in matrix notation yields: 
Illi =r 1ll1_1 + TIZI _ 2 + !l + E I 	 (A-3) 
where = [ -(1-0 11 ) ° 12 ] ;and 
r 0 21 -(1-0 22 ) 
0= [-(1- 0 Il - 0 13 ) (0 12 + ° 14) ] 
(0 21 + 0 23 ) -(1 - 0 22 - 0 24) 
Equation (A-3) is an ECM and TI is an equilibrium matrix. Three cases can now be 
considered which relate to the rank (i.e. the number oflinearly independent rows or 
columns) of TI ; 
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I. 	 Rank( I1 )=0. In this case (A-3) can be written as: 
t...Zr 	= r t...ZH + ~l + E, 
which is a vector autoregression (V AR) in first differences. There is no cointegration 
because C and Yare both I(1), and t...Z is 1(0). 
2. 	 Rank( I1 )=2. This occurs when the vector Z is stationary which contradicts the 
assumption that C and Yare I(1). 
3. 	 Rank( I1 )= 1. In this case, there is one independent row and the determinant of I1 
. . 
IS zero I.e.: 
-(I-I111 -I1 13 )[-(l-I1n -I12.J)]-(I112 +I1 14 )(n 21 +I12J= 0 (A-4) 
A further requirement is that one of the elements of n must be non-zero From (A-4), 
each of the terms in brackets is the long-run (equilibrium) coefficient on C or Yin (A­
4), requiring at least one of these variables to be included in the equilibrium 
relationship. In this example there are two variables. Because the rank is one, there 
can be only one cointegrating vector. 
As Holden and Thompson (1990) note, in the general case where rank (I1)= r, there 
are r cointegrating vectors. Two additional (n 54 x r) matrices, a and f3J can be defined 
such that n =aW where a represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, and 13' is 
a matrix of long-run coefficients. The rows of13 provide the rows of the r 
cointegrating vectors. Estimates of a and 13 are obtained by estimating the space 
spanned by 13 from the r largest canonical correlation coefficient between the residual 
of Zt.k and LlZt derived from regressing the respective variables on their lagged 
differences. Johansen's method uses a maximum likelihood method to estimate a 
'reduced rank regression' which estimates n eigenvalues and their eigenvectors. These 
eigenvalues measure how strongly the cointegrating relations (now denoted as WI Z,) 
correlate with the stationary part of the model 
54 n is the number of variables in the model. 
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To test for the number of cointegration vectors, the null hypothesis that there are at 
most r cointegration vectors is tested against the alternative that r+ J exist: 
HO: A,=O i=r+ J, . .. ,n 
The log of the restricted maximum likelihood function is compared to the maximum 
likelihood function of the unrestricted model, and a likelihood ratio test computed. 55 
The likelihood ratio test (or trace statistic) for there to be at least r co integrating 
equations is given by : 
Arrace - 21n(Q) = -T i1og(1- i,) 
i=r+l 
where Qequals the restricted maximum likelihood divided by the unrestricted 
maximum likelihood. Tests can also be performed to establish whether the estimates 
. 56 pro duced are unique. 
It is important to note that ifI(O) variables are included in the long-run estimation, then 
for every stationary variable included, the number of co integrating equations will 
increase. The rationale for this is that each 1(0) forms a cointegration relation on its 
own, and thus forms a linearly independent column of IT. Therefore, inclusion of 1(0) 
variables in the long-run model will increase the number of cointegrating equations by 
the number ofI(O) variables. 
55 See Appendix 8 for the tables which detcnnine the number of cointegrating vectors. 
56 TIlis arises because the reduced ran.k regression provides inl"onnatioll 011 the number of cointegrating vedors. 
Since any linear combination of the stationary vectors is also stationary. the estimates produced by any 
particular vector may not be unique. 
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Appendix B 
Econometric tests and diagnostics 
B.1. Unit root tests 
The standard test for stationarity is the unit root test. The Dickey Fuller (DF) 
approach is the most widely used. The basic form of the test is: 57 
Yr =Po Yr- I + u t 
or 
(1- L)Yt = ~Yt = (P a -l)Yt_1 + u t 
The null hypothesis of the test is HOPJ= 1 (there is a unit root) against the alternative 
HI: Pl<1. The distribution used to determine the critical values does not follow a 
standard normal but a Dickey Fuller distribution. 
One should also allow for the data generating process (d.g. p.) having an intercept and 
trend. Often the d.g p. is unknown. When this is the case a recommended testing 
strategy can be summarised by the following table . 
Table E.1: Testing procedure using the DF test when the data generating process is 
unknown 
T,(1) t.Yt =J.lc +Yct+(pc -1)Yt_ 1 +J.lt (Pc-1)=O (1981) 
(2) 	 t.Yt = J.lb + (Pb - I)Y t_ 1 + J.l, (Pb-1 )=0 Tf' Dickey and Fuller (1 981 ) 
(3) 	 t.Y, =(Pa -1)Yt_ 1 +J.l, (p.-l )=0 T Dickey and Fuller (1981 ) 
Source: Harris (1995) 
57 See Harris (1995) tor an eXl:cllent revil!w of the techniques of unit root testing. 
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Appcndix 13: Econom~lri~ Tcst.'; and Diagnosti~s 
Table B.2: Unit root tests: dependent variable .1] Yt 
c -4 .69* -3.80* -3 .35* 
YD 2 -3.76** -2.38*"* -2 .63* 
W -3 .73** -3 .60** -3.55* 
WH -3.77** -3.54** -3.59* 
INFL -5 .59* -5.31* -5.29* 
SSW 159 -4 .94* -4 .98* -5.05* 
U 2 -5 .86* -3.78* -3.44 * 
RE -4 .28* -4 .19* -4 .07* 
R -5 .34* -5 .27* -5.35* 
RT -3.69** -3.65*" -3.67* 
RP -6 .81 * -7 .05* -7.24* 
DEF -4 .89* -4.97* -4.76* 
* denotes rejection of the null hypoth~sis at the 1 percent level 
** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. 
*** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 perce nt level. 
The results in Table B.2 strongly indicate that none of the variables are 1(2) since the 
null hypothesis of the variables being 1(2) is rejected at the 1 and 5 percent levels . 
Whether the data is stationary in first differences, 1(1), or stationary in levels, 1(0), can 
be determined from Table B.3 . 
The results in Table B.3 from the null hypothesis that the data are 1(1) suggest that the 
real pre-tax interest rate and the relative return to saving are stationary in levels. All 
other variables are non-stationary in levels. U and DEF are possibly stationary in 
levels. Therefore, in the error-correction model to be estimated, all variables except 
the real pre-tax interest rate and relative return to saving should be specified in first 
differences (or log growth rates). The unemployment rate and budget deficit can 
possibly also be modelled in levels. 
58 111is variable was also significant at 2 lags at the 5 percent kveL 
59 1l1is variable was a lso s ignificant at 2 lags at the I percent leveL 
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Table B.3: Unit root tests: dependent variable L1 Yr 
Yo 
W 
WH 
INFL 
SSW 
U 
RE 
R 
RT 
RP 
DEF 
-1.18 
-3.25 
-2.90 
-1.29 
-2.51 
2 -3.61 ** 
-1.23 
-3.47*** 
-3.23 
-5.54* 
1 -3.94** 
-2.21 
-1.13 
-2.14 
-1.69 
-2 .56 
-0 .15 
-1.4 7 
-3.62** 
-2.8 
-4 .31 * 
-1 .25 
1.13 
-1.01 
-0.85 
-0.31 
0.05 
0.45 
0.52 
-3.55* 
-1.19 
-2.50** 
0.86 
• d~l1oks r~j~ction ofth~ null hypoth~sis at th~ 1 perc~nt I~vel 

•• denotes rej~ction ofth~ null hypothesis at th~ 5 pac~nt l~v~1. 

••• denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the \0 p~rant le vel. 

B. 1. 1 Testing for structural breaks 
Harris (1995) cautions that if a series has undergone a permanent shift (slope and/or 
intercept) during the period covered, "failure to take account of this change in the 
slope will be mistaken by the usual ADF unit root test as a persistent innovation to a 
stochastic trend" (pAO), i.e. a unit root test which does not allow for the structural 
break will have reduced power. 
If the breaks in the series are known, then the procedure to take account of the shift is 
to include appropriate dummy variables. The critical values to use are given in Perron 
(1989, 1990). If the date of the break is unknown, it is necessary to test for the 
possibility of a break. Two series, SSW and fNFL were suspected to possibly have 
structural breaks. SSW shows a large jump in 1971 caused by a change in 
measurement of retirement assets. GO A dummy variable is included to take account of 
this break. A dummy variable was also included for fNFL to allow for the effect of the 
00 Prior to 1971, retirement assets excluded industrial and insured funds. 
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oil price shocks in 1973-74 and 1979. The results of the unit root test allowing for 
these breaks are given below. 
Table B.4 Results of tests for structural breaks 
SSW -4.77* -4 .85* -4 .96* 
INFL 
SSW 
-5.99* -6.12* 
Oependent variable Ll YI 
-1.50 -1.57 
-6.14* 
-0 .22 
INFL -2.58 -2 .65 -1.41 
, denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the I percent level 
•• denotes rejection of the null hypothesi s at the 5 percent level. 
•• , denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 percent le vel. 
The table shows that structural change in either variable has not influenced their order 
of integration. 
B.2. Tests for cointegrating rank (Johansen method) 
The following section displays tables of tests of cointegration rank. Note that the real 
interest rate (R) is included in Tables B.8 to B.11 which is a stationary variable. Thus, 
one cointegrating equation is accounted for by the inclusion of this variable. Similarly, 
one of the cointegrating equations in Table B.ll is accounted for by DEF. 
Table B.5: Johansen test - equation (1) 
0.696307 99.63782 94 .15 103.18 none * 
0.494286 59.11876 68.52 76.07 at most 1 
0.355449 35.93807 47.21 54.46 at most 2 
0.308023 21.00521 29.68 35.65 at most 3 
0.186712 8.48633 15.41 20.04 at most 4 
0.042019 1.459539 3.76 6.65 at most 5 
NB: te;1 assumes a linear detemlini sti c trend in the data. Number of observations is 34. Variabks arc C, Y D, W, SSW, INFL, RE. 
'C") denotes rejecti on of the hypothesis at 5o/c.{ 1%) significance level. 
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Likelihood ratio test indicates I cointegrating equation at 5 percent significance level. 
Table B.6: Johansen test - equation (2) 
0.689459 98.85544 94.15 103.18 none * 
0.490654 59 .09453 68 .52 76.07 at most 1 
0.355892 36.15720 47.21 54.46 at most 2 
0.297866 21.20095 29.68 35.65 at most 3 
0.191654 9.17750 15.41 20.04 at most 4 
0.055558 1.94349 3.76 6.65 at most 5 
NB: test asSUI1l<!S a lin<!ar deterministic trend in the data. Number of observations is 34. Variables are C, YD, WH, SSW, INFL, RE. 
'C") denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 50/0( 1%) signilicanc<! level. 
Likelihood ratio test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5 percent significance level. 
Table B.7: Johansen test - equation (3) 
0.472493 46.554290 47.21 54.46 at most 1 
0.307082 24.808068 29 .68 35.65 at most 2 
0.177558 12.335346 15.41 20.04 at most 3 
0.154076 5.689089 3.76 6.65 at most 4* 
NB: test assumes a linear deterministic trend in the data. Number of observations is 34. Variables are C, YD, SSW, INFL, RE. 
'C") denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5°/0( 1%) significance level. 
Likelihood ratio test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5 percent significance level 
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Table B.S: Johansen test - equation (4) 
134.0288 109.99 119 .80 none ** 
0.676064 91 .15290 82.49 90 .45 at most 1** 
0.445431 52.82775 59 .46 66.52 at most 2 
0.346046 32.78260 39.89 45 .58 at most 3 
0.321229 18.34218 24.31 29.75 at most 4 
0.134780 5.16813 12.53 16 .31 at most 5 
0.007207 0.24593 3.84 6.51 at most 6 
NB: the test assumes no detenninistic trend in the data. Number ofobservations is 34. Variables are Y D, W, SSW, (NFL, RE, R. 
'(") denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significance level. 
Likelihood ratio test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at the 1 percent significance 
level. 
0.681021 
0.625632 
0.352071 
0.300637 
0.134307 
0.005038 
Table B.9: Johansen test - equation (5) 
104.2433 
65 .39392 
31.98838 
17.23328 
5.07539 
0.17173 
59.46 
39.89 
24.31 
12.53 
3.84 
66 .52 
45.58 
29 .75 
16 .31 
6.51 
at most 1* 
at most 2 
at most 3 
at most 4 
at most 5 
NB: the test assumes no detenninistic trend in the data. Number of observations is 34. Variables are C, Y D, W, SSW, RE, R. 
'(") denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 50/0( I%) significance level. 
Likelihood ratio test indicates 2 cointegrating equations at the 5 percent significance 
level 
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0.698190 
0.641405 
0.388536 
0.268219 
0.204939 
0.051453 
Table B.I0: Johansen test - equation (6) 
71 .80445 
36.93536 
20.21080 
9.59346 
1.79602 
68.52 
47.21 
29.68 
15.41 
3.76 
76.07 
54.46 
35.65 
20.04 
6.65 
at most 1* 
at most 2 
at most 3 
at most 4 
at most 5 
NB: the test assumes no detenninistic trend in the dat.l. Number of observat io ns is 34. Variables are Yo, W, SSW, INFL, RE, R. 
'C") denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1 %) significan ce le vel. 
Likelihood ratio test indicates 2 co integrating equations at the 5 percent significance 
level 
Table B.II: Johansen test - equation (7) 
0.827172 153.79970 109.99 119.80 at most 1 ** 
0.701473 94.11414 82.49 90.45 at most 2** 
0.452380 53.01167 59.46 66.52 a most 3 
0.343235 32.53778 39.89 45 .58 a most 4 
0.304555 18.24320 24.31 29 .75 at most 5 
0.154922 5.894297 12.53 16.31 at most 6 
0.005022 0.171190 3.84 6.51 at most 7 
NB: the test ass umes no detenn inistic trend in th e dalil. Number of observati ons is 34. Variables are Yo, W, SS W, INFL, RE, R, 
DEF. 
°C OO ) denotes rejecti on o f the hypoth es is at 50/0( 1%) significance level. 
Likelihood ratio test indicates 3 cointegrating equations at the 5 percent significance 
level. 
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B.3. Normality tests of residuals 
The figures below show a histogram of the residuals of the long-run equation (4) from 
the Johansen method and the short-run error-correction models. The Jarque-Bera 
statistic indicates the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed is 
accepted at the 5 percent level. 
B.3.1 Long-run cointegrating equation (Johansen method) 
Fig. E.1 Histogram of equation (4) residuals 
8~1---------------------------------' 
Series: Johansen equation (4) residual 
Sample 1960 1995 
Observations 36 
6 
Mean 19.58330 
Median 13.41704 
4 
Maximum 3980601 
Minimum -382 .7395 
Std. D v. 171 .1599 
Skewness -0022176 
2 Kurtosis 2.838102 
Jarque-Bera 0.042267 
Probability 0.979088 
o I r·,·, 
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400 
The null hypothesis is not rejected. 
B.3.2 Short-run ECMs 
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Figure. n.2 Histogram ofequation (1) residuals 
8~-------------------------------------, 
6 
4 
2 
o 
-0.03 -0 .02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Series: eqn (1) 
Sample 1962 1995 
Observations 34 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Oev. 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
Probability 
7.78E-06 
0.003238 
0.026578 
-0 .030382 
0.013811 
-0 .158906 
2.328271 
0.782318 
0.676273 
Figure. E.3 Histogram ofequation (2) residuals 
10,,----------------------------------~ 
8 
o I r""""'" 
-0.03 -0 .02 -0 .01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
88 
Series: eqn (2) 
Sample 1972 1995 
Observations 24 
Mean -6 .61 E-05 
Median 0.001985 
Maximum 0.023480 
Minimum -0.028872 
Std . Oev. 0.011364 
Skewness -0 .387921 
Kurtosis 3.344540 
Jarque-Bera 0.720637 
Probability 0.697454 
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Figure. B.4 Histogram ofequation (3) residuals 
6 
Series: eqn (3) 
5~ I Sample 1971 1995 Observations 25 
41 1::::::::/I:::::,:,::n:!:}}':!n:!:}})!1 I Mean -5.43E-05 
Median 0.001516 
3~ 1•.. •.• ,.. IIfftJ:):)tu:t:':m:)F'(t(1 I Maximum 0.023269 Minimum -0.027393 
Std. Dev. 0.011453 
2~ 1'@::,',lH@ff:l:'}':::::flf,::::::'::::J:,':,,;::,{1 I ...·.....·.....·, I I Skewness -0 .015824 
Kurtosis 2.985194 
J arque-Bera 0.001272 
Probability 0.999364 
o . . . 
-0 .03 -0 .02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
The null hypothesis is not rejected for any equation. 
8.4. Stability tests - recursive estimation of short-run 
ECMs 
Recursive least squares repeatedly estimates the equation using increasing subsamples 
of the data. Initial estimates of the coefficients are calculated . The next observation is 
then added and another estimate of the coefficient is calculated. This process is 
repeated until all observations are used. At each step, the coefficients are used to 
estimate the value of the dependent variable in the next period . The forecast error is 
the recursive residual. 
A valid model has recursive residuals which are independently and normally distributed 
with zero mean and constant variance. Residuals outside the two standard error bands 
suggest parameter instability. 
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Figure B.5 Recursive residuals: equation (1) 
O . 06~~----------------------------------------------------~ 
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Recursive Residuals -------- ± 2 SE 
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6 (2) 
0,03~r--------------------------------------------------------. 
0,02 
0,01 -l 
0,00 I / \ l 'v' I 
-0,01 
-0,02 
-0,03 
~,MI I 
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
±2 
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saving, total personal saving may increase because the marginal propensity to consume 
non-pension wealth is less than pension wealth 
Because of liquidity constraiilts, taxation of pension funds appears to be a better route 
to increasing total saving than saving incentives, provided the tax revenue adds to 
government saving The extent of the tax revenue generated under the current tax 
structure49 will depend on the extent that fund managers substitute away from bonds 
towards equities. 
Furthermore, the taxation of pension funds, combined with a reduction in corporate 
taxation, would increase total private saving by the corporate and personal sectors, 
without a corresponding fall in public sector saving. Reduced corporate taxation may 
help in stimulatinge investment because of increased retained earnings reducing the 
need for capital market borrowing. 
4.2.2.3 Government debt reduction 
Smith (1990:45) makes the important point that government debt is related to 
unfunded social security. Social security in the form of pension benefits can be 
regarded as a future claim on the government, comparable to the claim represented by 
a government bond. Their similarity implies that if social security adversely affects 
private saving, then government debt should do the same,50 thereby refuting the 
Ricardian Equivalence theorem. This proposition is in contrast to the long-run policy 
implications of the LCH. Recall that under the LCH, private wealth is independent of 
national debt. Which view is correct depends on one's convictions as to the accuracy 
of the LCH. Both views are possible in the South African case because the Ricardian 
Equivalence proposition was not supported by the data. 
The implication of this is that increasing total saving may be best achieved by 
increasing government saving. This will reduce the level of debt in South Africa, 
49 Currently a 17 percent tax on int~rest income of retirement funds. 
50 	Smith does acknowledge the difTen:nces between govenunent debt and social security. Govenunent debt 
"obligations are much less open to change, are marketable, are more easily measured, and are less 
uncertain ... changes in govenunent debt arc more apparent and certain than those in social security wealth, and 
there will probably be greater agreement on their likely efTeds" (p.4S). 
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which may boost the private saving rate. 5 I Although public debt is not high by world 
standards, current debt-servicing obligations demand around 18 cents of every rand 
available in the budget (Annett. 1996). Thus, creating an environment conducive to 
attracting foreign direct investment, combined with public debt reduction will aid in 
reaching economic growth targets52 This argument is supported by the analysis 
identifying an inverse relationship between personal saving and the budget deficit. 
Increasing government saving will also have a number of desirable side effects. The 
lack of support for Ricardian Equivalence strongly suggests that bond financed 
government deficits increase interest rates,53 and thus crowd out private investment. 
Related to this point is that reducing budget deficits makes monetary policy more 
manageable. If the Reserve Bank is targeting interest rates, then, in response to a bond 
financed deficit, it may increase the growth rate of the money stock to prevent interest 
rates from rising. This puts upward pressure on inflation. Reducing budget deficits 
will therefore enable the Reserve Bank to have more control over inflation. As the 
results in chapter 3 showed, if inflation can be lowered, personal saving will be 
stimulated. Reducing budget deficits will also have positive effects on the trade 
balance. When the government runs a deficit, aggregate demand is stimulated, 
increasing the demand for imports and therefore worsening the trade balance. 
4.3. Research implications 
This study has attempted to answer many pertinent questions regarding personal saving 
in South Afri~a, and analysed issues previously not dealt with in the literature. It has 
also established an avenue for future research. Future research should look to confirm 
or refute the conclusions reached in this paper. In particular; 
1. 	 Compile demographic and industry-wide data in order to estimate a Feldstein-type 
pension wealth variable. This would permit simulations to be performed in which 
key variables could change, e.g. tax rates and income growth. It would also allow 
51 Public debt in South Africa as at December 1995 was 57 percent of GOP. 

52 See GEAR (1996) for details of the integrated macroeconomic strategy to be implemented in South Africa. 

53 This is because the increased supply of bonds is not met by incf(:ased demand by individuals. This lowers the 

price of bonds which increases the interest rate. 
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CI);lp!~r four: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
a derivation of unfunded pension wealth. This would be useful in estimating the 
net effect of all retirement schemes on total saving as opposed to analysing just 
funded schemes. Estimating the extent unfunded pensions have impacted on the 
saving rate would also enable an analysis of the impact of government debt on 
private saving. 
2. 	 Conduct a comprehensive cross-section surveyor compilation of demographic and 
industry-wide data on fund members. This would allow alternative quantitative 
techniques to be used (probit/logit estimation) to compare with the time series 
estimates in this paper. 
3. 	 Complie accurate personal wealth data. This is essential for macroeconomic 
analysis and policy formulation. An official wealth series would also confirm 
whether the wealth proxy used in this paper is a fair approximation of household 
wealth in South Africa. Given that the marginal propensity to consume non­
pension wealth is an integral part of the analysis of pensions funds on saving, a 
representative wealth series is crucial. 
4. 	 Future research should re-estimate the model using quarterly data. Quarterly 
wealth data (pension and non-pension) is unavailable, at least historically. 
Quarterly indicators should be obtained and reconciled to the annual benchmarks. 
Quarterly estimation of the model would determine whether the reasonably low 
sample size in this study has affected the accuracy of the estimates. 
4.4. Summary 
Because of the nature and composition of personal saving in South Africa, the extent 
that government policy can influence the personal saving rate is limited. To increase 
the supply of capital necessary for economic growth, policy should rather be directed 
towards increasing government sector saving, and attracting foreign direct investment. 
Policy directed towards increasing government sector saving, and attracting foreign 
direct investment is a better route to increasing the supply of capital necessary for 
economic growth. Increasing public saving, and reducing public debt levels will also 
indirectly stimulate private saving. The ideal method to increase public saving is fiscal 
discipline. This will produce positive spinoffs via its impact on interest rates, inflation, 
and the trade balance. It will also convey positive signals to economic agents 
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App~ndix B: Econometric Tests and Diagnostics 
Figure B. 7 Recursive residuals: equation (3) 
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From the figures, equations (2) and (3) appear to display parameter instability. 
Recursive coefficients trace the evolution of the coefficients as more observations are 
added. Significant variation in the path is an indication of instability. The two 
standard error bands act as a guide for determining instability. 
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Appendix B: Econolllolric T~s\s and Diagnostics 
Figure B.8 Recursive coefficients: equation (1) 
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